jueves, 24 de marzo de 2011

Las tareas del Derecho de Sociedades

La entrada anterior critica la doctrina de los “legal origins” desde el punto de vista del objetivo de garantizar la protección de los inversores. Este artículo de John Ohnesorge se plantea la cuestión desde un punto de vista previo: ¿qué objetivos debe perseguir un Derecho de sociedades eficiente? Y la respuesta depende del nivel de desarrollo de la economía:
… for a developing country…, the major tasks of corporate law would be to encourage entrepreneurs to invest their own capital in productive enterprises, to help them attract early-stage capital from outside investors as necessary, and to give them the incentives and the flexibility that would allow them to take the large risks that they will face as they try to capture markets and to grow.
Y, parece,
. None of these tasks is closely related to the strength of minority shareholder protections in corporate law, the central concern of Legal Origins. Limited liability is probably crucial, but early private equity investors, like creditors, can protect themselves through contract rather than statutory corporate law protections. As for the incentive structure and the flexibility necessary to build a substantial corporation, both of these may well be in conflict with highly developed legal protections for minority shareholders. … …
constrain majority shareholders for the protection of minority shareholders, … seems like a secondary or intermediate task of corporate law in developing countries, not the primary task, unless one assumes that external equity finance is crucial, which the historical success of bank-centered financial systems in Germany, Japan, and elsewhere has shown is not correct.
Peor, puede ser contraproductivo
Legal Origins tends to vilify the entrepreneur, such as the chaebol chairman, who creates and leads the corporation, but without that entrepreneur, there is no business. History, in America as well as Northeast Asia, suggests that successful capitalist development must leave plenty of room for the play of what Keynes called the “animal spirits.” Keynes wrote that “[m]ost, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as a result of animal spirits—of a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction . . . .” Corporate law in developing countries must play some role in protecting investors from the “animal spirits” of founders and controlling shareholders. To that end Legal Origins can be helpful. But, at the same time, it must encourage the release of entrepreneurial energy without which there will be no growing, successful corporations in which minority shareholders can invest
Y recoge esta cita de Hurst
“The substance of what business wanted from law was the provision for ordinary use of an organization through which entrepreneurs could better mobilize and release economic energy.” Entrepreneurs wanted from the law an “orderly capital subscription procedure under which capital could be fed into the enterprise,” they wanted limited liability, and they wanted “a form of organization which firmly and broadly delegated power over mobilized capital to managers and directors.”
Se comprenderá que los que consideramos el Derecho de Sociedades como Derecho de las Organizaciones cuya función es facilitar a los grupos de personas la persecución de fines comunes en común estemos muy a gusto con este tipo de análisis.

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