Por qué es más fácil ponerse de acuerdo para estandarizar un producto que para subir los precios o repartirse los mercados

 

Networks, Anarcho-Capitalism, and the Paradox of Cooperation  Bryan Caplan and Edward Stringham Aquí

Ponerse de acuerdo para no celebrar contratos con aquellos que han incumplido previamente es fácil, porque atenerse a lo acordado es, también, la mejor estrategia individual (si no contrato con el incumplidor evitaré el riesgo de que también incumpla su contrato conmigo). Pero cuando se trata de ponerse de acuerdo para subir los precios o repartirse los mercados – cárteles – las cosas son más difíciles, porque incumplir el acuerdo es la estrategia individualmente preferible (no subir los precios al nivel acordado y quedarme con la clientela). Por eso es más fácil que se produzcan espontáneamente acuerdos de estandarización que cárteles. Por las mismas razones que es más fácil organizar un boicot contra un moroso que hacerlo contra las que lleven faldas rojas

“Competitive pressure reinforces statistical discrimination based on real group differences – for example, that people who broke contracts in the past are more likely to break them in the future. But at the same time competitive pressure dissolves taste-based discrimination against, say, redheads. (Sowell, 1994) Unregulated markets will be neither generically "discriminatory" nor "non-discriminatory"; some forms thrive while others wither.

… In coordination games, it is relatively easy to reach the cooperative outcome: If all of the other banks issue ATM cards of a certain size, an oddball bank that refuses to conform is only hurting itself. But in prisoners' dilemmas, widespread expectations of cooperative play actually sweeten the temptation to defect. If all of the other banks collude to charge exorbitant fees, the profits of the deviant bank that under-cuts them rise. Though it is conceivable that the banking network might surmount this with extensive monitoring and punishment, there can be no doubt that solving coordination problems is far less challenging

Standardizing products and fixing prices bear little resemblance to each other: It is the difference between a coordination game and a prisoners' dilemma. As long as consumers want a uniform product, adhering to industry standards is self-enforcing. As long as consumers prefer low prices to high prices, pricefixing is not. Ability to reach the cooperative outcome in the former in no way "implies" ability to reach the cooperative outcome in the latter… Coordination problems are much easier to solve than prisoners' dilemmas, so any network strong enough to enforce collusion will at least be strong enough to realize the benefits of uniformity