miércoles, 24 de febrero de 2010


El siguiente párrafo pertenece a la introducción de un artículo de Acharya/Myers/Rajan, titulado, "The Internal Governance of Firms". No dice, obviamente, nada original – está en la introducción del artículo – pero no se me ocurre un resumen mejor de la estructura de gobierno de las sociedades anónimas de capital disperso:

A public corporation is commonly viewed as an organization run by CEOs and monitored by a board of directors on behalf of public shareholders. This view separates decision management (by the CEO and other managers) from decision control (by the board) and from investment and risk-bearing (by public shareholders). This governance structure is viewed as reasonable and efficient-…provided that decisions are made to maximize the value of shareholders' residual claim. Many public corporations thrive in this governance structure. Yet the clear evidence that public corporations "work" has to be set against the equally clear evidence that most shareholders have little control over boards… and that many boards treat CEOs generously… CEOs are self interested, not automatically faithful servants of the shareholders... The market for corporate control can provide some discipline, but it is hard to see it as effective in controlling operational decisions. How then do we reconcile the survival and apparent efficiency of the public corporation with the weak channels through which it is supposedly governed?

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