El otro blog para cosas más serias

El otro blog para cosas más serias
El otro blog para cosas más serias

martes, 9 de marzo de 2010

Grandes casos: los de la coronación

A veces, los casos son más interesantes por lo que se ha escrito sobre ellos que por lo que los jueces que los decidieron dijeron.

La narración del caso está tomada de Eisenberg,


"Edward VII was to be crowned in Westminster Abby on June 26, 1902, and the coronation procession was to be held on June 26 and June 27. Krell, who had a flat in London, had left England in March 1902. Before he left, Krell instructed his solicitor to let the flat on such terms, and for such period, up to six months, as the solicitor thought proper. On June 17, Henry noticed an announcement on the exterior of Krell’s flat that windows to overlook the coronation procession were to be let. Henry then entered into an agreement, confirmed in writing on June 20, to take the flat for the days, but not the nights, of June 26 and June 27, for £75, and put down £25 as a deposit. Very shortly thereafter, Edward became ill, and on June 24 his physicians decided that he required surgery. As a result, the coronation and procession were postponed. Henry did not pay the £50 remaining under the agreement, and Krell sued for that amount. The court held for Henry. In the leading opinion, Lord Justice Vaughan Williams said, “I think it cannot reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the contracting parties when the contract was made, that the coronation would not be held on the proclaimed days . . . or along the proclaimed route.”


El comentario de Eisenberg:

"Now suppose the contract in Krell v. Henry had explicitly stated, “This agreement is made on the assumption that the coronation procession willtake place in six days, as scheduled.” In that event, an analysis based on unexpected circumstances would have been unnecessary. Instead, Henry would have prevailed as a matter of interpretation. In the actual case, the relevant assumption was tacit, rather than explicit. In contrast to explicit shared assumptions, whose effect normally falls within the domain of interpretation, tacit shared assumptions are at the heart of unexpected-circumstances cases

Pero Werner Flume considera que es un caso de imposibilidad (art. 1184 CC) porque entiende que la prestación debida incluía poder presenciar el desfile “La prestación acordada, la cesión del uso del puesto en la ventana para presenciar el desfile de coronación, devino imposible. El arrendador queda liberado…” W. FLUME, El negocio jurídico, trad. esp. Madrid, 1998, p 588

Y Goldberg dice que, de imprevisible, nada. Que había seguros y futuros sobre la suspensión de la coronación debido a la mala salud y hábitos poco saludables de Eduardo VII. Goldberg - como Flume - prefiere discrepar a tener razón.

Y aquí, una sentencia de Posner sobre un caso de impracticability, en la que se ve el genio del profesor/juez

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