El otro blog para cosas más serias

El otro blog para cosas más serias
El otro blog para cosas más serias

miércoles, 27 de mayo de 2009

"HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST"

William Kolasky (Competition Policy International, 2009 pp 173 ss) ha recensionado el libro de título citado. Dos citas de la recensión

"we may need to broaden the lens of our antitrust analysis of proposed mergers beyond a myopic focus on their immediate impacts on narrow markets, as defined using the current Merger Guidelines SSNIP test. We need to focus more attention—as antitrust did in the past—on the impact of the merger on the broader “line of commerce” in which the merging firms compete"
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Por ejemplo, la definición de mercados en las fusiones entre compañías aéreas (ruta punto a punto o, en general, rutas de medio y corto alcance) en la Decisión de la Comisión Europea Ryanair/Aer Lingus. Muy ilustrativo el trabajo de Voigt, St., und A. Schmidt (2005), Making European Merger Policy More Predictable,
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Professor Hovenkamp argues in favor of using a more neutral test that defines monopolistic conduct as acts that: “(1) are reasonably capable of creating, enlarging, or prolonging monopoly power by impairing the opportunities of rivals; and (2) that either (2a) do not benefit consumers at all, or (2b) are unnecessary for the particular consumer benefits that the acts produce, or (2c) produce harms disproportionate to the benefits.” ... As I have written elsewhere, ... As the Supreme Court recognized in California Dental Ass’n v. FTC,8 in the context of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the rule of reason requires a stepwise analysis, in which the courts should apply a sliding scale at each step of the analysis. Thus, the stronger the showing of harm to competition in step (1), the closer the court should scrutinize the claimed benefits and the availability of less restrictive alternatives to achieve them. Applying this sliding scale, it should rarely be necessary for a court to reach the final, most difficult step of having to balance the competitive harms and benefits of the conduct at issue".
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Y es que, no es solo que sea difícil hacer esa ponderación. Es que es una ponderación económica, no jurídica, (o si se quiere, cuantitativa vs. cualitativa) que es la que saben hacer los jueces por lo que debería evitarse en todo caso salvo que nos conformemos con cualquier cosa.

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