We identify three mechanisms through which exclusive arrangements between platforms and applications can affect competition and welfare.
Se refieren, por ejemplo, a los acuerdos entre los que diseñan videojuegos y Xbox de manera que esos juegos sólo pueden jugarse en la “plataforma” Xbox.
First, and most obviously, exclusive arrangements limit the ability of consumers to mix and match components. For a given set of products and prices, this limitation reduces welfare.
Obvio. La utilidad que extraigo de la plataforma es inferior a la que podría obtener si pudiera mezclar a voluntad plataformas y aplicaciones
Second, we show that, when otherwise undifferentiated platforms can differentiate themselves through exclusive deals with differentiated applications, equilibrium prices under platform competition are higher than they otherwise would be.
También bastante obvio. Los dueños de las plataformas pueden exigir un precio más elevado una vez que han elevado los costes de cambiar para sus clientes (cambiar de plataforma)
The softening of price competition leads to a third effect: the market equilibrium may support a larger number of platforms than when there are no exclusive arrangements.
Esto es menos obvio.
In the presence of fixed costs, platform providers must be able to charge prices greater than average variable cost in order to earn non-negative profits. When the same applications are available on multiple (undifferentiated) platforms, competition drives prices toward marginal cost. Consequently, the market equilibrium with non-exclusive applications may support only one provider. By softening price competition, exclusive arrangements can lead to (softened) platform competition instead of platform monopoly. Hence, when viewed in the context of the full process of entry and pricing, exclusive arrangements can lead to greater competition and lower prices. The net effects of exclusive arrangements on consumer surplus and total surplus can be positive or negative, depending on the parameter values.
The analysis (particularly that of the component pricing model) also demonstrates that there is no One-Market-Power-Rent Theorem analogous to the One-Monopoly-Rent Theorem. That is, an imperfectly competitive supplier (applications in our model) can increase its profits by tying its product to a good that would otherwise be competitively supplied.
El Teorema “sólo hay una renta de monopolio” dice que un monopolista no puede incrementar su renta de monopolio vinculando la venta de su producto a otro –competitivo- . Sin entender el modelo, parece que los efectos positivos sobre el bienestar social dependerán, en parte, de las ventajas de tener varias plataformas en lugar de una sola de modo semejante a si es mejor tener varias redes de electricidad o una sola. Según las innovaciones y el aumento de capacidad que quepa esperar, puede ser preferible tener varias plataformas a tener una sola.
No hay comentarios:
Publicar un comentario