Gelter sobre el interés social

In the US, “stakeholder” arguments and institutional theories of the corporation tended to be brought forward in defense of the status quo, which is characterized by an unusual degree of managerial power. By contrast, similar theories in France and Germany served as a possible argument to constrain large firms there, namely large blockholders, and to prevent them from using their influence in a way that hurts the firm, minority shareholders, and other stakeholders. In other words, “pro-stakeholder” arguments stood on two different sides of the debate: Perhaps critics of prevailing corporate structures had better reasons to advocate stakeholder protection than their American counterparts

Gelter, Martin, Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation? Shareholder-Stakeholder Debates in a Comparative Light (August 31, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669444

No. Tanto en los EE.UU como en Europa continental, los argumentos a favor de una concepción plural o institucional del interés social los realizan los insiders, los que detentan el control. En EE.UU, lo alegan los administradores para protegerse frente a las OPAs hostiles y en Europa, los accionistas minoritarios que controlan la compañía para explicar por qué sobornan a otros grupos que les ayudan a mantenerse en el control. Los “perjudicados” por estas doctrinas son los mismos a ambos lados del Atlántico: los accionistas dispersos. No entiendo cómo puede decirse que las doctrinas institucionalistas en Francia o Alemania se formularon para

“defend the corporation against the effective controllers of the firm – large shareholders – in order to limit outside influence that was sometimes detrimental. Institutional theories were suggested to defend corporations against their shareholders. The “interest of the corporate entity” – a core concept in Germany and France– was originally intended as a mechanism to balance conflicting interests and to avoid abuses, although the practical significance has remained limited.

Los accionistas significativos habían nombrado a los administradores, de manera que no tenían que preocuparse porque les limitaran su influencia en los asuntos de la sociedad.